One Health Security is an independent research and policy publication examining the governance of interconnected biological risk. We publish evidence-based analysis for researchers, policymakers and professionals working across animal health, public health, biosecurity, preparedness and international governance.
Out Now
·August 2026
Our first issue: five linked analyses on trust as biosecurity infrastructure — from EU animal-health law and Denmark's compensation model to the human legacy of foot-and-mouth disease, and a proposal for measuring trust before the next emergency.
One Health Security Review No. 001
The Economics of Prevention
Our focus
One Health is now well established as a framework for understanding the connections between human, animal and environmental health.
Our concern is narrower: what happens when interconnected biological risks encounter fragmented systems of governance?
Responsibility for animal health, public health, trade, environmental protection, food systems, emergency response and economic recovery is frequently distributed across different institutions, laws and jurisdictions. Biological risks cross those boundaries more readily than institutions do.
One Health Security examines that governance problem. We focus particularly on the structures through which biological risk is anticipated, governed, communicated, financed and recovered from — and on the gaps that appear when responsibilities cross conventional institutional boundaries.
The Governance Problem
Human health emergencies are managed through the International Health Regulations. Animal health standards are developed by WOAH. Trade measures intersect with biosecurity under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary regime. Environmental drivers fall within separate multilateral processes.
Each regime is rational within its own domain. Collectively, they form a patchwork. Zoonotic risk does not emerge in segments — and the legal architecture has not yet fully caught up with the epidemiological reality. The open-source tools and research underpinning this work are available on GitHub.
Analysis
Analysis represents reasoned interpretation of the available evidence and is not presented as peer-reviewed research unless explicitly stated.
View Analysis →Government
Briefings summarise and interpret official sources and existing evidence for research and policy audiences and are not offered as legal advice.
View Government →Research
Publication through One Health Security does not imply academic peer review unless an item is explicitly identified as peer reviewed.
View Research →From One Health to One Health Security
If zoonotic emergence is treated exclusively as a public health event, governance remains reactive. If it is understood as a structural risk to economic stability, supply chains, and state capacity, the logic shifts.
One Health Security advances a security-oriented governance lens — not to militarise public health, but to recognise that biological risk management is now a core function of state resilience.
Across animal and human health systems, with formalised links to national crisis governance structures.
Incentivising transparency rather than creating the conditions for delayed disclosure.
Recognition that surveillance weaknesses in one jurisdiction constitute vulnerabilities for all.
Complementary mandates across international organisations, reducing ambiguity during crises.
Reform that is politically feasible, recognising sovereignty sensitivities while strengthening cooperative obligations.
Applied Research develops open methods and tools through which questions raised in One Health Security analysis can be examined more systematically.
A structured framework for analysing zoonotic and biosecurity risk within a One Health context. It translates biological, environmental, and agricultural variables into a composite risk signal, and evaluates how policy interventions modify that risk — supporting structured, reproducible decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.
Designed to connect with secure biological data infrastructure provided by The BioChain, forming part of the broader One Health Security framework integrating policy modelling, outbreak simulation, and spatial risk mapping.
Model Variables
Livestock density · Wildlife contact · Water quality · Vaccination coverage · Veterinary access · Human exposure · Farm biosecurity
Policy Scenarios
Baseline · Improved biosecurity · Vaccination expansion · Veterinary access · Integrated One Health intervention
Framework Integration
Advisory
One Health Security works with organisations addressing complex questions in zoonotic risk, biosecurity and biological preparedness. Our advisory work draws directly on the research, analysis and methods published through One Health Security.
Advisory is a separate applied activity informed by One Health Security research. Editorial conclusions are not determined by advisory relationships.
Explore Advisory →Areas of work
From research to application
Our advisory work applies the same evidence-led approach developed through One Health Security research, Applied Research and Resources.
What is One Health?
The modern One Health concept recognises that the health of humans, animals and ecosystems cannot be separated. International collaboration between the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Environment Programme has strengthened cross-sector dialogue.
Scientifically, the premise is uncontroversial. A majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic in origin. Spillover occurs at the interface of livestock systems, wildlife reservoirs, and human populations. Ecological degradation, agricultural intensification, and climate variability shape pathogen dynamics in ways that defy sectoral categorisation.
Yet One Health remains more conceptually integrated than legally operationalised. It has achieved intellectual coherence. It has yet to achieve institutional coherence.
One Health Security concentrates on that institutional gap. Rather than attempting to reproduce the broad educational and technical resources already provided by international organisations and established One Health initiatives, we examine the governance structures required when biological risks move between sectors, species and jurisdictions.
Read the founding essayWhy governance now matters
"Effective governance is no longer optional. It is structural."